any error was harmless because the jury necessarily determined that the arrest was supported by probable cause when it found for the City on some of Lozman’s other claims—specifically, his claims that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and state law. Id., at 751–752. And, under precedents which the Court of Appeals deemed controlling, the existence of probable cause defeated a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest. See id., at 752 (citing Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (CA11 2002)).
This Court granted certiorari, 583 U.S. ___ (2017), on the issue whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest under §1983. The Court considered this issue once before, see Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 (2012), but resolved the case on different grounds.
II
The issue before the Court is a narrow one. In this Court Lozman does not challenge the constitutionality of Florida’s statute criminalizing disturbances at public assemblies. He does not argue that the statute is overly broad, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); or that it impermissibly targets speech based on its content or viewpoint, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); or that it was enforced in a way that curtailed Lozman’s right to peaceful assembly, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). Lozman, furthermore, does not challenge the validity of the City Council’s asserted limitations on the subjects speakers may discuss during the public-comment portion of city council meetings (although he continues to dispute whether those limitations in fact existed).
Instead Lozman challenges only the lawfulness of his
