Opinion of the Court
Failing all else, Sturgis closes with an appeal to congressional purpose. Brief for Respondents 22–24. The school district worries that our understanding of §1415(l) would frustrate Congress’s wish to route claims about educational services to administrative agencies with “ ‘special expertise’ ” in such matters. Id., at 22. But “it is … our job to apply faithfully the law Congress has written,” and “ ‘[w]e cannot replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress’ intent.’ ” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017) (quoting Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U. S. 320, 334 (2010)). Even on its own terms, it is unclear what the school district’s argument proves. Either interpretation of §1415(l) operates to preclude some unexhausted claims. Under our view, for example, a plaintiff who files an ADA action seeking both damages and the sort of equitable relief IDEA provides may find his request for equitable relief barred or deferred if he has yet to exhaust §1415(f) and (g). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. It is “quite mistaken to assume,” too, that any interpretation of a law that does more to advance a statute’s putative goal “must be the law.” Henson, 582 U. S., at 89. Laws are the product of “compromise,” and no law “ ‘pursues its … purpose[s] at all costs.’ ” Ibid. And it isn’t exactly difficult to imagine that a rational Congress might have sought to temper a demand for administrative exhaustion when a plaintiff seeks a remedy IDEA can supply with a rule excusing exhaustion when a plaintiff seeks a remedy IDEA cannot provide. * The parties pose a number of additional questions they would like us to answer—including whether IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is susceptible to a judge-made futility exception and whether the compensatory damages Mr. Perez seeks in his ADA suit are in fact available under that statute. But today, we have no occasion to address any of
