observers believe, might have availed to turn the tide in their favour. The battle of Mukden was a great defeat, though not an overwhelming disaster. At one period the result hung in the balance, and it is no wild statement to say that if the Russian cavalry had been trained and armed in orthodox cavalry fashion, and handled in a manner consistent with cavalry tradition, Mukden would have proved a drawn battle. It is my firm belief—a belief shared with many others more competent to judge—that if French, with 10,000 British cavalry, had been given a free hand early in the war on the Russian side, there would have been no necessity for Kuropatkin to retire from his strong position at Liao-yang, and I have no less hesitation in saying that if the same able commander, with such a cavalry force as I have mentioned, had been attached to the Japanese side at Liao-yang or at Mukden, there would be no Russian army in Manchuria to-day. En passant it may be remarked that if the Japanese cavalry had been capable of pursuit at Mukden, it would have proved a terrible thorn in the already bleeding Russian side. As it was, the Japanese were out-numbered and hence completely ineffective."
If the writer of this article is correct in his deduction of the lesson to be learned by cavalry from this war—and his opinion has since been confirmed by military opinion generally,—it would appear that the machine gun is just the one thing needed to give cavalry the fire power
