first object is successfully attained and the fire of the section brought to bear on the enemy's squadron, from any range under 800 yards, for only 30 seconds, the effect on the closed body of horsemen, whether in column or line, would be such as to throw them into considerable confusion at the moment of the charge, while any attempt to charge the guns, even by a second squadron, must be abortive and result in disaster. The squadron leader should have arranged beforehand with his machine-gun commander to manœuvre with a view to this co-*operation, and will give the signal a few moments before wheeling into line to attack, when the machine guns will gallop out to the most suitable flank, and come into action as rapidly as possible so as to enfilade the enemy's advance. The moment the charging squadrons mask the fire of the guns, they must remount and gallop to a fresh position in anticipation of the pursuit, in order to bring fire to bear on the retreating enemy and prevent a rally; or to cover the retirement of the squadron and enable it to rally and reform. The effect of his fire and the success or otherwise of the first collision will enable the section commander to decide instantly which of these two actions will be necessary. It will be seldom that the country is so flat that some feature cannot be found giving a good field of fire or commanding a road, or bridge, or other defile by which the enemy must retreat, or which they must pass in pursuit, and the use of such
