Page:Mallory v. Norfolk Southern.pdf/10

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Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of Gorsuch, J.

business in the forum to agree to defend themselves there against any manner of suit. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1867, 14 Stat. 404; 1889 Nev. Stats. p. 47; S. C. Rev. Stat., Tit. 7, ch. 45, §1466 (1894); Conn. Gen. Stat. §3931 (1895). Yet another group of States applied this all-purpose-jurisdiction rule to a subset of corporate defendants, like railroads and insurance companies. See, e.g., 1827 Va. Acts ch. 74, p. 77; 1841 Pa. Laws p. 29; 1854 Ohio Laws p. 91; Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 112, §68 (1855); Ark. Stat., ch. 76, §3561 (1873); Mo. Rev. Stat., ch. 119, Art. 4, §6013 (1879). Mr. Mallory has collected an array of these statutes, enacted between 1835 and 1915, in his statutory appendix. See App. to Brief for Petitioner 1a–274a.^[1]

↑ Norfolk Southern and the dissent observe that some state courts applied these laws narrowly. Brief for Respondent 43–44; post, at 11–12, and n. 4 (Barrett, J., dissenting). But, as we will see in a moment, others did not. Part III, infra. Even state courts that adopted narrowing constructions of their laws did so by invoking statutory interpretation principles and discretionary doctrines. Notably, neither Norfolk Southern nor the dissent has identified a single case (or any other source) from this period holding that all-purpose jurisdiction premised on a consent statute violates the Due Process Clause. Indeed, some of the decisions they cite presumed just the opposite. See, e.g., Camden Rolling Mill Co. v. Swede Iron Co., 32 N. J. L. 15, 17–18 (1866) (a law like Pennsylvania’s “could be judicially adopted” consistent with due process if clearly expressed); Sawyer v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 46 Vt. 697, 706–707 (1874) (similar). Nothing in this body of case law, then, comes close to satisfying Norfolk Southern’s burden of establishing that consent statutes like Pennsylvania’s “ ‘offen[d] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked’ ” among those secured by the Due Process Clause. Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 445–448 (1992). In saying this much, we hardly suggest, as the dissent supposes, that the practice of States or their courts is irrelevant. Post, at 11, n. 3. Our point is simply that Norfolk Southern has not met its burden of showing that original and historic understandings of due process foreclose consent statutes.

[1] Norfolk Southern and the dissent observe that some state courts applied these laws narrowly. Brief for Respondent 43–44; post, at 11–12, and n. 4 (Barrett, J., dissenting). But, as we will see in a moment, others did not. Part III, infra. Even state courts that adopted narrowing constructions of their laws did so by invoking statutory interpretation principles and discretionary doctrines. Notably, neither Norfolk Southern nor the dissent has identified a single case (or any other source) from this period holding that all-purpose jurisdiction premised on a consent statute violates the Due Process Clause. Indeed, some of the decisions they cite presumed just the opposite. See, e.g., Camden Rolling Mill Co. v. Swede Iron Co., 32 N. J. L. 15, 17–18 (1866) (a law like Pennsylvania’s “could be judicially adopted” consistent with due process if clearly expressed); Sawyer v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 46 Vt. 697, 706–707 (1874) (similar). Nothing in this body of case law, then, comes close to satisfying Norfolk Southern’s burden of establishing that consent statutes like Pennsylvania’s “ ‘offen[d] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked’ ” among those secured by the Due Process Clause. Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 445–448 (1992). In saying this much, we hardly suggest, as the dissent supposes, that the practice of States or their courts is irrelevant. Post, at 11, n. 3. Our point is simply that Norfolk Southern has not met its burden of showing that original and historic understandings of due process foreclose consent statutes.

[1]

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