Opinion of Gorsuch, J.
IV
Now before us, Norfolk Southern candidly asks us to do what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could not—overrule Pennsylvania Fire. Brief for Respondent 36–38. To smooth the way, Norfolk Southern suggests that this Court’s decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), has already done much of the hard work for us. That decision, the company insists, seriously undermined Pennsylvania Fire’s foundations. Brief for Respondent 34–36. We disagree. The two precedents sit comfortably side by side. See post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.).
A
Start with how Norfolk Southern sees things. On the company’s telling, echoed by the dissent, International Shoe held that the Due Process Clause tolerates two (and only two) types of personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant. First, “specific jurisdiction” permits suits that “ ‘arise out of or relate to’ ” a corporate defendant’s activities in the forum State. Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–6). Second, “general jurisdiction” allows all kinds of suits against a corporation, but only in States where the corporation is incorporated or has its “principal place of business.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5). After International Shoe, Norfolk Southern insists, no other bases for personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant are permissible. Brief for Respondent 13–15; see post, at 2–4 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
But if this account might seem a plausible summary of some of our International Shoe jurisprudence, it oversimplifies matters. Here is what really happened in International
Post, at 4. And neither Pennsylvania Fire, nor our later decisions applying it, nor our precedents approving other forms of consent to personal jurisdiction have ever imposed some sort of “magic words” requirement. See infra, at 22–23; Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U. S., at 95; Neirbo Co., 308 U. S., at 175.
