Page:Mallory v. Norfolk Southern.pdf/19

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MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO.

Opinion of Gorsuch, J.

v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 204 (1977).

Given all this, it is no wonder that we have already turned aside arguments very much like Norfolk Southern’s. In Burnham, the defendant contended that International Shoe implicitly overruled the traditional tag rule holding that individuals physically served in a State are subject to suit there for claims of any kind. 495 U. S., at 616 (plurality opinion). This Court rejected that submission. Instead, as Justice Scalia explained, International Shoe simply provided a “novel” way to secure personal jurisdiction that did nothing to displace other “traditional ones.” Id., at 619. What held true there must hold true here. Indeed, seven years after deciding International Shoe, the Court cited Pennsylvania Fire approvingly. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 446, n. 6 (1952).[1]

B

Norfolk Southern offers several replies, but none persuades. The company begins by pointing to this Court’s decision in Shaffer. There, as the company stresses, the Court indicated that “ ‘prior decisions … inconsistent with’ ” International Shoe “ ‘are overruled.’ ” Brief for Respondent 35


  1. Norfolk Southern and the dissent observe that, today, few States continue to employ consent statutes like Pennsylvania’s. Brief for Respondent 22; post, at 9–10, 15, n. 6. Surely, too, some States may see strong policy reasons for proceeding differently than Pennsylvania has. See, e.g., State ex rel. Am. Central Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr, 300 S. W. 294, 297 (1927) (abandoning construction of Missouri law at issue in Pennsylvania Fire based on “the legislative policy in th[e] state”); cf. Cooper Tire, 312 Ga., at 437, 863 S. E. 2d, at 92 (Bethel, J., concurring) (suggesting Georgia’s consent scheme “creates a disincentive for foreign corporations to” do business in-state and conflicts with the State’s claim to be “ ‘business-friendly’ ”). But the meaning of the Due Process Clause is not measured by the latest popularity poll, nor does it come with some desuetude rule against a traditional practice like consent-based jurisdiction long held consistent with its demands. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 110–111 (1921).