Opinion of Gorsuch, J.
that as a raft of meaningless formalities.[1]
Taken seriously, this argument would have us undo not just Pennsylvania Fire but a legion of precedents that attach jurisdictional consequences to what some might dismiss as mere formalities. Consider some examples we have already encountered. In a typical general jurisdiction case under International Shoe, a company is subject to suit on any claim in a forum State only because of its decision to file a piece of paper there (a certificate of incorporation). The firm is amenable to suit even if all of its operations are located elsewhere and even if its certificate only sits collecting dust on an office shelf for years thereafter. See, e.g., Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 924. Then there is the tag rule. The invisible state line might seem a trivial thing. But when an individual takes one step off a plane after flying from New Jersey to California, the jurisdictional consequences are immediate and serious. See Burnham, 495 U. S., at 619 (plurality opinion).
Consider, too, just a few other examples. A defendant who appears “specially” to contest jurisdiction preserves his defense, but one who forgets can lose his. See York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, 19–21 (1890). Failing to comply with certain
- ↑ While the dissent joins Norfolk Southern in this argument, it wavers. At points, the dissent seems to insist that laws like Pennsylvania’s “mak[e] no sense.” Post, at 5–6. But the closest the dissent comes to identifying authority for the notion that laws like these are impermissible are two cases that did not involve personal jurisdiction or purport to interpret the Due Process Clause. Post, at 8 (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (1874); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186 (1887)). The dissent’s observation that one of those cases in turn cited Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (1856), hardly helps—that decision approved a consent-to-suit regime for out-of-state corporations under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id., at 405–407. At other points, however, and as we have seen, the dissent rightly acknowledges that a “ ‘variety of legal arrangements [may] represent express or implied consent’ ” to personal jurisdiction consistent with due process, and these arrangements can include requiring at least some companies to consent to suit in exchange “for access to [a State’s] markets.” Post, at 4, 6.
