Opinion of Alito, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21–1168
ROBERT MALLORY, PETITIONER v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, EASTERN DISTRICT
[June 27, 2023]
Justice Alito, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
The sole question before us is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a large out-of-state corporation with substantial operations in a State complies with a registration requirement that conditions the right to do business in that State on the registrant’s submission to personal jurisdiction in any suits that are brought there. I agree with the Court that the answer to this question is no. Assuming that the Constitution allows a State to impose such a registration requirement, I see no reason to conclude that such suits violate the corporation’s right to “ ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945).
I am not convinced, however, that the Constitution permits a State to impose such a submission-to-jurisdiction requirement. A State’s assertion of jurisdiction over lawsuits with no real connection to the State may violate fundamental principles that are protected by one or more constitutional provisions or by the very structure of the federal system that the Constitution created. At this point in the development of our constitutional case law, the most appropriate home for these principles is the so-called dormant Commerce Clause. Norfolk Southern appears to have as-
