Page:Marco Rubio' Letter to Commerce, RE Semiconductor Export Controls.pdf/2

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expansion after confirming it can purchase American chipmaking equipment used for less-sophisticated products.[1]

The BIS rule needs to be strengthened, finalized, and vigorously enforced. I am therefore concerned by BIS’s apparent lack of progress. Seven months have passed since the rule was issued, and nearly four months since the public comment period ended. That is more than enough time to incorporate feedback and strengthen the export controls in question so they achieve their stated goal. Yet, a final rule has not appeared. As of today, the only update to the rule has been to add Macau to the export controls—correcting an embarrassing oversight since Macau has been a Special Administrative Region of China since 1999.

These errors and delays do not provide confidence that BIS is serious about slowing down, much less stopping, China’s development in advanced technology and exploitation of current export controls. I respectfully request answers to the following questions:

  • When will BIS issue the final version of the October 7, 2022 export-control rule?
  • What steps is BIS taking to strengthen this rule so that companies cannot circumvent it to enable China’s progress in AI and other advanced fields?
  • Has BIS delayed finalizing the rule, which is meant to defend the United States, in order to accommodate Korean chipmakers?
  • Does BIS plan to grant Korean chipmakers a second, one-year license to give them time to wind down their business in China?
  • What is the status of Samsung and SK Hynix’s efforts to wind down their operations in China and comply with the interim rule?

Thank you for your prompt attention to these questions.


Sincerely,
M< R
Marco Rubio
U.S. Senator