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- 2. If the court finds that those provisions may have created enforceable rights, the defender next argues that those rights are indivisible and they would therefore require to be vindicated jointly with Dr Lindberg, the other party to the Agreement; or would be enforceable only by third parties. An ancillary issue arose as to whether any obligation accepted by a previous Lyon (eg in the Agreement) was binding on a subsequent Lyon.
- 3. If the court found that the Agreement created enforceable obligations, the defender next argued that those obligations had in any event been terminated. In reply, the pursuer argued that the obligations in the Agreement were not terminable, or not terminable except on a material change of circumstances for which, it is said, the defender had no averments. Esto the Agreement was capable of termination, and which was not confined to a material change of circumstances, the pursuer then argued that the Agreement could only be terminated upon the giving of reasonable notice and, separately, no reasonable notice had been given (though this last variation might require proof). (I shall refer to the cluster of questions under the heading "the termination issue".)
- 4. The defender contends that the provisions of the Agreement on which the pursuer relies are not valid and are unenforceable against the defender because:
- (i) they unlawfully fetter the exercise of a prerogative discretion, and
- (ii) on the pursuer's averments, they are designed to support values in a secondary market in baronial dignities.
