Page:Margaret Hamilton of Rockhall v Lord Lyon King of Arms.pdf/27

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27

[44] If the pursuer were correct in her averment that the Agreement could only be terminated on a material change of circumstance (which for the reasons already noted, the defender denies), parties are in dispute about whether there has been such a material change. The defender has made relevant averments about this point, namely: (i) the appointment of a new holder of the office of Lord Lyon King of Arms; (ii) the publication in Menking, Petitioner of a new policy; (iii) the use, as averred by the pursuer, of the prerogative powers of the Lord Lyon to support a market in baronies; and (iv) the misuse of Letters Patent by holders of baronies who have obtained new grants of arms from the Lord Lyon.


Submissions on behalf of the pursuer

Pursuer's motion

[45] Mr Lindsay invited the court to sustain the pursuer's first, second and third pleas-in-law and to pronounce decree de plano in terms of the first and second conclusions. The pursuer does not seek interdict in terms of the third conclusion, as it considers that the defender, as the holder of a public office, will abide by the terms of any declarator pronounced by this court. In the alternative, the court should delete certain of the defender's averments and thereafter allow a proof before answer on the issues which remain in dispute between the parties.

[46] Mr Lindsay divided his submissions into the following chapters: (1) the court's jurisdiction over the present proceedings, (2) the pursuer's title and interest to bring the present proceedings, (3) the binding nature of the Agreement, (4) why the Disputed Wording breaches the Agreement, (5) why the Disputed Wording is contrary to Menking, (6) why the Agreement cannot be terminated by reasonable notice, (7) why there has been no