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view, wholly inimical to the articulation of a policy or practice by him that is capable of binding successors in the office of Lord Lyon in the grant of arms. Putting it another way, by reason of the nature of the royal prerogative power exercised, any policy or practice articulated is not capable of creating correlative rights or expectations in favour of prospective applicants for the grant of arms (much less in entities who facilitate such applications for commercial gain). In the very special context under consideration, any attempt to purport to bind not only himself but his successor in office as Lord Lyon, which is the effect of the pursuer's reading of paragraph 4 of the Agreement, would clearly be incompetent. In my view, the phraseology in proviso (i), of "if so required", is therefore plainly inept. This conclusion arises from an analysis of the power exercised, not the nature of the Lord Lyon's office. It is therefore not necessary to consider the discrete arguments about the nature of the Lord Lyon's office, the consequences of not being a corporation sole or whether the Lord Lyon or the Advocate General is the proper defender. I reserve my opinion on those matters.
[87] Furthermore, this analysis of the nature of the royal prerogative exercised in the grant of arms is amply supported by the discussion by Sir Thomas Innes of Learney of the ancient origins and status of the office of Lord Lyon (see, eg chapter 2 of Scots Heraldry, 2nd ed, 1956) and the nature of the powers the Lord Lyon exercises. In the recognition and grant of arms, the Lord Lyon exercises the royal prerogative in place of the Monarch. By its nature, the Lord Lyon enjoys the widest discretion in the exercise of the royal prerogative. This is entirely concomitant with the grant of arms only ever being a matter of grace, not right. It is hard to identify in modern times an exercise of prerogative power enjoying a greater degree of discretion than that vested in the Lord Lyon in respect of the grant of arms.
