the other hand, he looked for help and friendship to Henry of England. It was natural that the two defeated candidates should band themselves together against the winner. Francis was sincerely attracted to Henry. Friendship, no less than policy, counselled him to make this tall, vigorous, blond young Saxon his ally. But Henry, it would appear, had never much reliance on his brilliant neighbour. He had the inbred natural English mistrust of a French jackanapes, and, in this special case, it did as well as penetration. He was jealous of Francis's success in sport, in love, in war, and, while the French King thought he was winning Henry by his grace and his vivacity, he was really only fostering the blind antagonism of Henry, only feeding his jealousy, and his dislike to feel himself inferior. Moreover, though it was certainly advantageous for France—always more or less at war with the Empire—to make a firm alliance with England, England could choose between France and Austria; and England, with her laden ships sailing ever to and from the port of Antwerp—commercial, industrious England might naturally choose the power which ruled the Netherlands.
In the treaty of 1515 between France and England, there stood a clause providing that the two kings should meet each other in personal interview at some place on the confines of their dominions, somewhere between French Ardres and English Calais.
At last, in 1520, this friendly encounter was finally arranged. France and England half ruined their resources for each to shine once in the eyes of the other. During three weeks the jousting and revelling went on; for three weeks Francis tried all his graces on his rival, hoping to win his trust, and gaining instead
