withdrew the appointment. When I told Halpine I had, of course, no idea he was going to repeat it; besides I did not think there was any harm in telling.
Immediately after this episode I formed a partnership with Roscoe Conkling and George W. Chadwick to buy cotton. The outcry which the manufacturers had raised over the inability to get cotton for their industries had induced the government to permit trading through the lines of the army, and the business looked profitable. Conkling and I each put $10,000 into the firm, and Chadwick gave his services, which, as he was an expert in cotton, was considered equal to our capital. To facilitate our operations, I went to Washington to ask Mr. Stanton for letters of recommendation to the generals on and near the Mississippi, where we proposed to begin our operations. Mr. Stanton and I had several conversations about the advisability of allowing such traffic, but he did not hesitate about giving me the letters I asked. There were several of them—one to General Hurlbut, then at Memphis, another to General Grant, who was planning his operations against Vicksburg, and another to General Curtis, who commanded in Arkansas. The general purport of them was: "Mr. Dana is my friend, you can rely upon what he says, and if you can be kind to him in any way you will oblige me."
It was in January, 1863, that Chadwick and I went to Memphis, where we staid at the Gayoso Hotel, at that time the swell hotel of the town and the headquarters of several officers.
It was not long after I began to study the trade in cotton before I saw it was a bad business and ought to be stopped. I at once wrote Mr. Stanton the following letter which embodied my observations and gave my opinion as to what should be done:
Dear Sir:—You will remember our conversations on the subject of excluding cotton speculators from the regions occupied by our armies in the South. I now write to urge the matter upon your attention as a measure of military necessity.
The mania for sudden fortunes made in cotton, raging in a vast population of Jews and Yankees scattered throughout this whole country, and in this town almost exceeding the numbers of the regular residents, has to an alarming extent corrupted and demoralized the army. Every colonel, captain, or quartermaster is in secret partnership with some operator in cotton; every soldier dreams of adding a bale of cotton to his monthly pay. I had no conception of the extent of this evil until I came and saw for myself.
Besides, the resources of the rebels are inordinately increased from this source. Plenty of cotton is brought in from beyond our lines, especially by the agency of Jewish traders, who pay for it ostensibly in treasury notes, but really in gold.
What I would propose is that no private purchaser of cotton shall be allowed in any part of the occupied region.
Let quartermasters buy the article at a fixed price, say twenty or twenty-five cents per pound, and forward it by army transportation to proper centers, say Helena, Memphis, or Cincinnati, to be sold at public auction on government account. Let the sales take place on regular fixed days, so that all parties desirous of buying can be sure when to be present.
But little capital will be required for such an operation. The sales being frequent and for cash will constantly replace the amount employed for the purpose. I should say that two hundred thousand dollars would be sufficient to conduct the movement.
I have no doubt that this two hundred thousand dollars so employed would be more than equal to thirty thousand men added to the national armies.
My pecuniary interest is in the continuance of the present state of things, for while it lasts there are occasional opportunities of profit to be made by a daring operator; but I should be false to my duty did I, on that account, fail to implore you to put an end to an evil so enormous, so insidious, and so full of peril to the country.
My first impulse was to hurry to Washington to represent these things to yon in person; but my engagements here with other persons will not allow me to return East so speedily, I beg you, however, to act without delay if possible. An excellent man to put at the head of the business would be General Strong. I make this suggestion without any idea whether the employment would be agreeable to him.
Charles A. Dana.
Mr. Stanton.
P.S.—Since writing the above I have seen General Grant, who fully agrees with all my statements and suggestions, except that imputing corruption to every officer, which of course I did not intend to be taken literally.
I have also just attended a public sale by the quartermaster here of five hundred bales of cotton, confiscated by General Grant at Oxford and Holly Springs. It belonged to Jacob Thompson and other notorious rebels. This cotton brought to-day over a million and a half of dollars, cash. This sum alone would be five times enough to set on foot the system I recommend, without drawing upon the treasury at all. In fact there can be no question that by adopting this system the quartermaster's department in this valley would become self-supporting, while the army would become honest again and the slave-holders would no longer find that the rebellion had quadrupled the price of their great staple, but only doubled it.
As soon as I could get away from Memphis I went to Washington, where I had many conversations with Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton about restricting the trade in cotton. They were deeply interested in my observations, and questioned me closely about what I had seen. My opinion that the trade should be stopped had the more weight because I was able to say, "General Grant and every general officer whom I have seen hopes it will be done."
