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GENERAL JAMES A. GARFIELD. BORN IN 1831; DIED IN 1881.
Entering the army as a lieutenant-colonel of volunteers in 1861, Garfield was promoted to brigadier-general in 1862 and to major-general in 1863. He served as chief of staff to General Rosecrans from February, 1863, to October, 1863. Meanwhile he had been elected to Congress. He served there until March 4, 1880. when he went to the Senate. March 4, 1881, he became President. He was shot July 2, 1881, by Guiteau, and died September 19.
generally understood or appreciated at that time that because of Thomas's repeated calls for aid, and Rosecrans's consequent alarm for his left, Crittenden had been stripped of all his troops and had no infantry whatever left to command, and that McCook's lines also had been reduced to a fragment by similar orders from Rosecrans and by fighting. A strong opposition to both sprang up, which my telegrams to Mr. Stanton immediately after the battle fully reflect. The generals of division and of brigade felt the situation deeply, and said that they could no longer serve under such superiors, and that, if this was required of them, they must resign. This feeling was universal among them, including men like Major-Generals Palmer and Sheridan and Brigadier-Generals Wood, Johnson, and Hazen.
The feeling of these officers did not seem in the least to partake of a mutinous or disorderly character; it was rather conscientious unwillingness to risk their men and the country's cause in hands which they thought to be unsafe. No formal representation of this unwillingness was made to Rosecrans, but he was made aware of the state of things by private conversations with several of the parties. The defects of his character complicated the difficulty. He abounded in friendliness and approbativeness, and was greatly lacking in firmness and steadiness of will. In short, he was a temporizing man; he dreaded so heavy an alternative as was now presented, and hated to break with McCook and Crittenden.
It was the same in regard to Negley. Rosecrans claimed that Negley had withdrawn his division from the battle on Sunday without orders and with his ranks undisturbed. When this was stated to me
