for an armistice to arrange terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end Pemberton asked that three commissioners be appointed to meet a like number to be named by himself. Grant immediately wrote a reply:
"The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.
"I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above."
Bowen, the bearer of Pemberton's letter, who had been received by A. J. Smith, expressed a strong desire to converse with General Grant. While declining this, Grant requested Smith to say to Bowen that if General Pemberton desired to see him an interview would be granted between the lines, in McPherson's front, at any hour in the afternoon which Pemberton might appoint. After Bowen's departure a message was soon sent back to Smith accepting the proposal for an interview and appointing three o'clock as the hour. Grant was there with his staff and with Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan, and A. J. Smith. Sherman was not present, being with his command, watching Joe Johnston, and ready to spring upon the latter as soon as Pemberton was captured. Pemberton came late, attended by General Bowen and Colonel (L. M.) Montgomery.
It must have been a bitter moment for the Confederate chieftain. Pemberton was a Northern man, a Pennsylvanian by birth, from which State he was appointed to West Point, graduating in 1837. In the old army he fell under the spell of Jefferson Davis's influence, whose close friend he was. Davis appears to have thought Pemberton was a military genius, for he was jumped almost at a stroke, without much previous service, to be a lieutenant-general, and the defense of the Mississippi River given over to his charge. His dispositions throughout the entire campaign, after Grant crossed at Bruinsburg, were weak, and he was easily overcome, although his troops fought well. As Joe Johnston truthfully remarks in his "Narrative," Pemberton did not understand Grant's warfare at all. Penned up, and finally compelled to surrender a vital post and a great army to his conqueror, an almost irremediable disaster to his cause, Pemberton not only suffered the usual pangs of defeat, but he was doubly humiliated with the knowledge that he would be suspected and accused of treachery by his adopted brethren, and that the result would be used by the enemies of Davis, whose favorite he was, to undermine the Confederate administration. As it transpired, it was indeed a great blow to Davis's hold upon the people of the South. These things must have passed through Pemberton's mind as he faced Grant for this final settlement of the fate of Vicksburg.
The conversation was held apart between Pemberton and his two officers and Grant, McPherson, and A. J. Smith, the rest of us being seated on the ground near by.
We could, however, see that Pemberton was much excited and was impatient in his answers to Grant. He insisted that his army be paroled and allowed to march beyond our lines, officers and all, with eight days' rations drawn from their own stores, officers to retain their private property and body servants. Grant heard what he had to say, and left him at the end of an hour and a half, saying that he would send in his ultimatum in writing before evening; to which Pemberton promised to reply before night, hostilities to cease in the meantime. Grant then conferred at his headquarters with his corps and division commanders, all of whom except Steele, who advised unconditional surrender, favored a plan proposed by McPherson, to release on parole the entire garrison, which Grant finally adopted. The argument against the plan was one of feeling only. In its favor was urged that it would at once not only tend to the demoralization of the enemy, but release Grant's whole army for offensive operations against Joe Johnston and Port Hudson; while to guard and transport so many prisoners would require a great portion of its strength. Keeping them would also absorb all our steamboat transportation, while paroling them would leave it free to move our troops. Paroling would otherwise save us an enormous expenditure.
After long consideration, General Grant reluctantly gave way to these reasons, and at six p.m. sent a letter by the hands of General Logan and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, in which he stated as terms that, as soon as rolls could be made out and paroles signed by officers and men, Pemberton would be allowed to march out of our
