Mein Kampf
But if we were to see this alone as the characteristic picture of the man, we would be doing him a grave injustice. Besides being a shrewd tactician he had the qualities and the genius of a truly great reformer, even though here too he was restricted by exact knowledge of actually existing possibilities and of his own personal capacity.
This truly outstanding man set himself a completely practical goal. He wanted to capture Vienna. Vienna was the heart of the Monarchy; from this city the last remnants of life went out into the sickly and aging body of the rotten Empire. The healthier the heart became, the more vigorously the rest of the body must recuperate.
The idea was right in principle, but could be put in practice for only a certain limited time. And that was the weakness of the man.
What he achieved as Mayor of the city of Vienna is immortal in the best sense of the word; but that did not enable him to save the Monarchy—it was too late.
This his adversary Schönerer had seen more clearly.
What Dr. Lueger attacked in practice succeeded marvelously; what he hoped for as a result was not fulfilled.
What Schönerer wanted he could not accomplish; but what he dreaded unfortunately did happen to a fearful degree.
Thus neither man attained his ultimate goal. Lueger was too late to save Austria, Schönerer to preserve the German people from destruction.
It is vastly instructive for us today to study the causes of both parties’ failure. It is particularly useful for my friends, since at many points conditions today are like those of that time, and mistakes can be avoided which brought about the end of one movement and the sterility of the other.
In my opinion there were three reasons for the collapse of the Pan-German movement in Austria: first, only vague ideas of the importance of the social problem, particularly to a new and by nature revolutionary party.
Schönerer and his followers addressed themselves primarily
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