7. The Revolution
Enemy propaganda had begun on us in 1915; from 1916 on, it became more and more intensive, to swell by the beginning of 1918 to a veritable inundation. The effects of this fishing of souls were to be seen at every step. The army gradually learned to think as the enemy wished it to.
The German counter-efforts were a complete failure.
In the leader whose mind and will then guided the army, there no doubt existed the intention and decisiveness to take up the struggle in this direction as well as elsewhere; but the necessary instrument was lacking. And it was a mistake, even psychologically, for the army itself to undertake this enlightenment upon the troops. If it was to be effective, it had to come from home. Otherwise it was impossible to count on success among men whose immortal deeds of heroism and endurance during nearly four years had been performed for that very homeland.
But what did come from home?
Was the failure stupidity or villainy?
In mid-summer of 1918, after the retreat from the southern bank of the Marne, the German press had begun to behave with such wretched ineptness, in fact with such criminal stupidity, that I asked myself with daily increasing chagrin whether there was really no one to put an end to this intellectual squandering of the army’s heroism.
What happened in France when we swept into the country in 1914 in an unparalleled whirlwind of victory? What did Italy do while her Isonzo front was collapsing? What did France do in the spring of 1918, when the assaults of the German divisions seemed to be unhinging the French positions and the far-reaching arm of
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