Page:Mein Kampf (Stackpole Sons).pdf/200

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

Mein Kampf

The Italian collapse especially, in the Autumn of 1917 had had a marvelous effect; in this victory people saw a proof of the possibility of breaking through the front at other places beside the scene of the Russian campaign. A splendid faith flooded back into the hearts of the millions, and made it possible for them to hold out for the spring of 1918 with relieved assurance. The enemy, on the other hand, was visibly dejected. That winter things were somewhat calmer than usual. It was the calm before the storm.

But just as the front was making the final preparations to terminate the endless struggle at last, as endless transport-trains of men and supplies were rolling toward the Western Front and the troops were being groomed for the great attack, in Germany the greatest blackleg trick of the war broke out.

Germany must not win. At the last moment, when victory threatened to follow the German banner, a means was resorted to which seemed calculated at a blow to throttle the German spring attack at birth, and to make victory impossible.

The munitions strike was organized.

If it succeeded, the German front would collapse, and the wish of the Vorwạ̄erts newspaper that victory might not follow the German banner this time would be fulfilled. From lack of munitions the front would be broken through in a few weeks; the offensive would be prevented, the Entente saved, and international capital made master of Germany—this then was the inner goal of the Marxist swindle upon the peoples something which the honorable gentlemen succeeded in. Destruction of the national economy in order to establish the rule of international capital—thanks to the stupidity and credulity of one side and the fathomless cowardice of the other.

So far as starving the front for armaments went, the munitions strike did not, it is true, have the full success that was hoped for: it collapsed too early for the munitions shortage in itself to condemn the army to destruction, as was planned. But haw much worse was the moral damage that was done!

Firstly, what was the army still fighting for, if people at home

194