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be proposed for reconsideration, but by some one who voted in favor of the former decision, and declares that he has since changed his opinion. I do not recollect accurately enough, whether it be necessary that his vote should have decided that of his State, and the vote of his State, have decided that of Con gress.
Perhaps, it might have been better, when they were forming the federal constitution, to have assimilated it, as much as possible, to the particular constitutions of the States. All of these have dis tributed the legislative, executive and judiciary powers, into differ ent departments. In the federal constitution, the judiciary powers are separated from the others ; but the legislative and executive are both exercised by Congress. A means of amending this defect, has been thought of. Congress having a power to establish what committees of their own body, they please, and to arrange among them the distribution of their business, they might, on the first day of their annual meeting, appoint an executive committee, consist ing of a member from each State, and refer to them all executive business which should occur during their session ; confining them selves to what is of a legislative nature, that is to say, to the heads described in the ninth article, as of the competence of nine States only, and to such other questions as should lead to the establish ment of general rules. The journal of this committee, of the preceding day, might be read the next morning in Congress, and considered as approved, unless a vote was demanded on a parti cular article, and that article changed. The sessions of Congress would then be short, and when they separated, the Confederation authorises the appointment of a committee of the States, which would naturally succeed to the business of the executive com mittee. The legislative business would be better done, because the attention of the members would not be interrupted by the de tails of execution; and the executive business would be better done, because, business of this nature is better adapted to small, than great bodies. A monarchical head should confide the exe cution of its will to departments, consisting, each, of a plurality of hands, who would warp that will, as much as possible, towards wisdom and moderation, the two qualities it generally wants. But, a republican head, founding its decrees, originally, in these two qualities, should commit them to a single hand for execution, giving them, thereby, a promptitude which republican proceedings generally want. Congress could not, indeed, confide their execu* tive business to a smaller number, than a committee consisting of a member from each State. This is necessary to insure the con fidence of the Union. But it would be gaming a great deal, to
