Page:Memoirs of Henry Villard, volume 2.djvu/274

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256
HENRY VILLARD
[1863

both sides of Lookout Creek and passed around the base of the mountain, but only paths led up to the plateau from the northwest; a zigzagging wagon road from Chattanooga Valley ran up the east side to the summit.

On the morning of the 24th, there were six brigades — Walthall's, Jackson's, and Moore's of Cheatham's division, and Pettus's, Brown's, and Cumming's of Stevenson's division distributed over Lookout Mountain for its defence. Major-General Stevenson had assumed command of both divisions when Lieutenant-General Hardee was ordered to the right. Pettus's brigade was on the summit, Brown's guarded the passes from the top to Nickajack Pass ten miles off. Jackson's and Cumming's brigades were stationed along the eastern base. Walthall's and Moore's brigades lay on the western and northern slope, below the Cravens house, on the left and right respectively, and they provided the picket line about two miles long up the east bank of Lookout Creek, in front of Hooker's line.

Hooker's first instructions, “to demonstrate only against the mountain,” were changed so as to require him to take the mountain if his demonstrations proved it practicable. He decided to deliver his main assault directly up the western slope against the rebel left. To climb not far from a thousand feet up the steep, broken, rocky mountainside against the well-sheltered enemy looked like a most formidable task of doubtful issue, but the plan to strike in one direction with all the available force brought success, owing to the scattering of the defenders over the summit and the three sides of the mountain at different heights, which made succor from any one of the rebel positions to any threatened point slow and difficult. On October 31, the present effective strength of Stevenson's division was 3102, and of Cheatham's 5467, or a total of 8569, while Hooker's infantry, after deducting train guards and other detachments, did not much exceed 7500. Hence, if it had been possible to concentrate the Confederates on the west side, the outcome would probably have been different. As it was, the