Cite as 2016 Ark. 157
It is well settled that there is a presumption of validity attending every consideration of a statute's constitutionality; every act carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, and before an act will be held unconstitutional, the incompatibility between it and the constitution must be clear. Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 (citing Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, 258 S.W.3d 744 (2007)). Any doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. See id. The heavy burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality is upon the one attacking it. See id. Finally, when possible, we will construe a statute so that it is constitutional. See id.
In determining the constitutionality of the statutes, we look to the rules of statutory construction. Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135. When construing a statute, the basic rule is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. (citing Rose v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 363 Ark. 281, 213 S.W.3d 607 (2005)). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine the legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. See id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. See id.
As a threshold issue, Mendoza asserts that respondents' motions challenging the constitutionality of section 27-37-703 are premature. She contends that this matter is not ripe because respondents did not introduce evidence of her nonuse of a seat belt. Respondents argue in their briefs that they cannot introduce evidence of Mendoza's nonuse of a seat belt because it is prohibited by section 27-37-703(a)(1), thereby placing respondents in a "catch-22" situation. We accepted the request from the district court to determine the certified
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