Cite as 2016 Ark. 157
Mendoza argues that the statute is a matter of substantive law, defining what is negligent for purposes of comparative fault and is therefore within the province of the legislature. She asserts that section 27-37-703 is a substantive alteration to the law of comparative fault or contributory negligence and not rules of pleading, practice, or procedure. Respondents assert that the statute is a matter of procedural law, which is exclusively in this court's domain.
Law is substantive when it is "[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of the parties." See Johnson, 2009 Ark. at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141 (quoting Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 237, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419–20 (2007) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1443 (7th ed. 1999))). Procedural law is defined as "[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves." Summerville, 369 Ark. at 237, 253 S.W.3d at 420 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1221 (7th ed. 1999)).
It is undisputed that the rules of evidence are "rules of pleading, practice and procedure." See Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 10, 308 S.W.3d at 142. We have held that the rules of evidence fall within this court's domain. See id., 308 S.W.3d 135 (citing Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986)). Accordingly, under our holding in Johnson, if the statute is a rule of evidence, then it violates separation of powers and is unconstitutional. In Johnson, we held that the nonparty provision of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-212(b), which limited the evidence that may be introduced at trial relating to the value of medical expenses, was unconstitutional. We held that the provision clearly dictated what
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