Cite as 2016 Ark. 157
children in child-restraint seats. The Eighth Circuit stated that section 27-34-106 established a rule of substantive law.
However, section 27-34-106 is distinguishable from section 27-37-703. The seat-belt statute states that evidence of nonuse may not be admitted, whereas section 27-34-106 provides that the failure to place children in child-restraint seats may not be admitted as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence.
Moreover, section 27-37-703 originally contained the same language found in the child-restraint statute. In 1991, section 27-37-703 provided in part as follows:
The failure to provide or use a seat belt shall not be considered under any circumstances as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence, nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence.
In 1995 Ark. Acts 1118, the language "shall not be considered under any circumstances as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence" and "with regard to negligence" was removed from section 27-37-703 by the legislature. However, the analogous language found in the child safety-seat statute was not removed.
Mendoza also argues that even if section 27-37-703 is strictly a rule of evidence, it is still valid based on Rule 402 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, which reads "all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this State." Mendoza contends that Rule 402 specifically empowers the legislature to determine relevance by statute and that the legislature properly exercised this power in the seat-belt statute. Mendoza relies on our holding in Bedell v.
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