Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/57

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995b
B. BOOK III

stance, whether does one science deal with all substances, or more than one, and if more, whether are all akin, or must some of them be called forms of Wisdom and the others something else?[1] And this itself is also one of the things that must be discussed—whether sensible substances alone should be said to exist or others also besides them, and whether these others are of one kind or there are several classes of substances, as is supposed by those who believe both in Forms and in mathematical objects intermediate between these and sensible things.[2] We must inquire, then, as we say, into these questions, and also whether our investigation is concerned only with substances or also with the essential attributes of substances.[3] Further, with regard to the same and other and like and unlike and contrariety, and with regard to prior and posterior and all other such terms, about which the dialecticians try to inquire, starting their investigation from probable premises only,—whose business is it to inquire into all these? Further, we must discuss the essential attributes of these themselves; and we must ask not only what each of these is, but also whether one thing always has one contrary.[4] Again, whether are the principles and elements of things the classes, or the parts present in each thing, into which it is divided;[5] and if they are the classes, whether are they the classes that are predicated proximately of the individuals, or the highest classes, e. g. whether is animal or man the first principle and the more independent of the individual instance?[6] And we must inquire and discuss especially whether there is, besides the matter, any thing that is a cause in itself or not, and whether this can exist apart or not, and whether it is one or more in number. Once more, is there something apart from the concrete thing (by the concrete thing I mean the matter with something predicated of it), or is there nothing apart, or is there something in some cases though not in others, and what sort of cases are these[7]? Again we ask whether the principles are limited in number or in kind, both those in

  1. Cf. 997a15-25.
  2. Cf. 997a34-998a19.
  3. Cf. 997a25-34.
  4. Cf. γ. 1003b32-1005a18, z. 10, and (I).
  5. Cf. 998a20-b14.
  6. Cf. 998b14-999a23.
  7. Cf. 999a24-b24.