country mutually acted, and reacted upon each other. Neither a student nor a traveller, he knew nothing of human character except as he saw it exhibited at home, and there he certainly sometimes found excuses for severity and even despotism. It is undeniable that he was endowed with a peculiar genius, but it was that kind of energetic genius which may raise a dexterous man from disgrace, defeat or reverses, rather than sustain him in power when he has reached it. He never was popular or relied for success on the democratic sentiment of his country. He ascertained, at an early day, that the people would not favor his aspirations, and, abandoning federalism, he threw himself in the embrace of the centralists. The army and the church-establishment,—combined for mutual protection under his auspices,—were the only two elements of his political strength; and as long as he wielded their mingled power, he was enabled to do more than any other Mexican in thoroughly demoralizing his country. As a military demagogue he was often valuable even to honest patriots who were willing to call him to power for a moment to save the country either from anarchy or from the grasp of more dangerous aspirants. Until the army was destroyed, Santa Anna could not fall, nor would the military politicians yield to the civil. As long as this dangerous chief and his myrmidons remained in Mexico, either in or out of power, every citizen felt that he was suffering under the rod of a Despot or that the progress of his country would soon be paralyzed by the wand of an unprincipled Agitator. But with the army reduced to the mere requirements of a police system, and Santa Anna beyond the limits of the Republic, the nation may breathe with freedom and vigor.[1]
Note. These historical sketches of the late war with Mexico are designed to present a rapid view of the chief events and motives of the international conflict rather than to portray the separate actions of civil and military men who were engaged in it. We have, therefore, not been as minute as might be desired either by ourself or by interested individuals. This, however, will be remedied in the general "History of the War between Mexico and the United States," which we design publishing.
In narrating the battles we have sketched them according to the published plans of the commanders on both sides. This is the fair system of describing and judging; but whether those plans were always the most judicious, is a matter for military criticism in which we have not present space to indulge. Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, Buena Vista, Vera Cruz, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, and the time as well as the mode of capturing the capital, have all been discussed and condemned by the prolific class of fault finders—most of whose judgments, when at all correct, are founded upon knowledge acquired or assured subsequently to the actions, and which was entirely inaccessible to the commanders when they fought the battles that are criticised. One thing, however, should gratify our Generals exceedingly, and it is that in truth they did fight and win the several actions in question, notwithstanding; their blunders and notwithstanding the fact that their junior civil and military critics could have fought them so much better! They had, it seems, a double triumph—one over their own stupid ignorance and another over the enemy!
- ↑ See vol. 2, chapter xii, p. 155. Reflections upon the Republic.
