repeated cases of treason in the army, added to the atmosphere of mistrust against the civilian population which had deliberately been fostered by the High Command, were enough to upset the confidence of any fighting force. After the dreadful disaster in East Prussia and after the Miassoiedov affair, when many officers were shot for high treason, the army was tremendously excited. The soldiers became very suspicious, and began to explain every misfortune by treason. The lack of munitions, the absence of reinforcements, in fact any sign of disorganisation in the army—everything was explained in whispers as being due ta high treason. There was indeed treason enough in many places, but the soldiers began to see it everywhere. Each man suspected his neighbour. The army was overwrought. It lived, as it were, in a nightmare from which there was no escape. While the advance was still going on this did not matter so much, but after the great and disastrous retreat from Galicia in 1915, the army began to fall to pieces.
I made up my mind to avoid in my account of the war and of the Revolution any reference to the psychology of the Russian people. Explanation by reference to the national psychology is always a very dubious and hazardous process. But perhaps I may be allowed the one exception of pointing out the extraordinary impulsiveness of the Russian people. It is not merely my private opinion; it is a generally recognised fact. The Russian character lacks the tenacity and stubbornness of the British race. Misfortune will always make the British soldier more obstinate and more stubborn. With the Russian it is not so. Success will increase his energy and efforts tenfold, but failure inevitably leads him to weariness and despair.
The light and frivolous treatment of the great Russian retreat by the Allied Press is fresh in our memories. The Grand Duke was the favourite of the Press, and was praised as the greatest strategist and tactician. The Russian newspaper experts also
