begun the struggle for peace, the army would have disintegrated much more rapidly and would have relapsed into a still more unhealthy condition. The democracy of Russia had only two alternatives: either to begin an active and systematic struggle for peace, or to wait and see how peace would come by the inevitable collapse. Peace had to be achieved. Either it had to be brought about by a strong and definite policy, or it would be forced on the country as a result of complete disorganisation. The repudiation of annexationist policy and the struggle for peace were expressions of the idealism of the Russian democracy. The Russian revolutionaries certainly could not have acted otherwise. They had been opponents of war all their lives; they saw and confessed the imperialistic basis of this war; they were bound to protest with all their might against its prolongation, all the more, so after the Revolution. The Revolution had created such a mighty spiritual exaltation that they believed more than ever in the triumph of the ideals of humanity, democracy, and internationalism. But these idealistic motives are insufficient to explain the energy and impetus with which the Russian democracy carried on their great struggle for peace. The point of view and the ideas which inspired them in their struggle for peace are fully explained by their idealistic motives. On the other hand, the force, the energy, the intensity with which they carried on that struggle are to be attributed solely to the actual conditions of the national economy and of the army.
The appalling condition of the army was one factor determining the struggle for peace. The other idea that obsessed the Russian democracy was the prevailing and traditional fear that Germany would come to crush the Revolution and try to reinstate the Monarchy. At this stage it is exceedingly difficult to describe how deeply and how hopefully democratic Russia wanted a revolution in Germany. The thought of a revolution in Germany was like a passion which obsessed the workers
