long process of accommodation between the Russian and German industries.
Thus, the closing of Russia's frontiers with Germany and (to a considerably less extent) with Austria, led to the cessation of Russia's foreign trade and to the paralysing of Russia's industry.
The situation was in fact tragic, and, had Russia had a more intelligent and less corrupt Government, it would have aroused the utmost attention and measures would have been taken to deal with it. During the first months of the war it is probable that Russian industry could have been reorganised and readjusted to deal with the situation with some measure of success. Missing links in the chain of industrial production could probably have been replaced in Russia itself, and the import of machinery, and especially of agricultural machinery, could have been arranged with Great Britain, America, and Japan.
But the essential condition for the success of any big scheme of reorganisation of industry was the placing of the whole industry under control of public institutions. However, the Russian Government was too stupid to grasp the gravity of the situation. It was too closely allied with the propertied classes to dare to interfere with their private interests, and too much afraid of any show of public spirit to allow the people to play any part in Russian industrial and political life. Control of industry was the only possible remedy. But it was not applied, and no attempt whatever was made to deal with the situation from a statesmanlike point of view.
In Germany there was developed down to the very smallest details a comprehensive plan, both defensive and offensive, to obviate the difficulties caused by the war and the blockade. In Russia the almost complete cessation of foreign trade and paralysis of industry—which would have been a disaster to any country and in the case of poor and undeveloped Russia was a catastrophe—aroused very little attention.
While the Press and the public were prophesying the
