sas legislature, expressed as it is in words different from those used in the regulation before us, is not relevant to this case.
The defendant’s second argument is that the government introduced insufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly used loud or abusive language in the emergency room.[1] (Aplt. B. at 9–10.) The defendant claims that “his physical and mental states were impaired” because, prior to being taken to the hospital, he had accidentally overdosed when taking prescription headache medicine. (Aplt. B. at 3, 10.)
The record contains sufficient evidence such that, when considered in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly used loud and abusive language. Witnesses who observed the defendant’s behavior both before and after he was brought into the emergency room testified that he was alert and aware of his surroundings, (Tr. at 19, 51), and that he could understand questions being asked of him and give appropriate answers. (Tr. at 103–04.) The defendant also recognized individuals at the VA hospital whom he had met before. (Tr. at 73.)
It is not implausible that, as the defendant tried to argue below, the defendant was unaware of his actions because he was suffering from the effects of an overdose of prescription medication, (Tr. at 136–37.) However, “the [Magistrate Judge], as fact finder, has discretion to resolve all conflicting testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw inferences from the basic facts to the ultimate facts.” United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir.1998)). The testimony by several witnesses supports the finding by the Magistrate Judge the that the defendant was, beyond a reasonable doubt, conscious and aware of actions at the hospital.
Because we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and because the evidence supporting the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the defendant acted knowingly is substantial and raises more than “a suspicion of guilt,” see id., we conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish this element of the offense.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the conviction.
This case was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter
MICHAEL FOUNDATION, INC., a foreign corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
URANTIA FOUNDATION, an Illinois Charitable Trust, Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Harry McMullan, III, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 01–6347, 01–6348.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 11, 2003.
- ↑ Neither party contests the fact that the defendant’s knowledge of his behavior was one of the elements of the offense that the government had to establish at trial.
