138 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. concepts are concrete and collective rather than abstract and distribu- tive.] Stephan Witasek. ' Wert und Schonheit.' [There is no peculiar kind of value which is distinctively aesthetic. The contrary assumption is due to a confusion between value and that which posseses value, in this case beauty.] A. Drews. ' Zur Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich.' [Denies that introspection is cognition of an ultimate reality. Behind conscious process, as its real basis, there is unconscious will. All will is unconscious, never a mode of consciousness.] Emil Bullaty. ' Das Bewusstseinsproblem.' [Material objects are not directly experienced, as hunger and toothache are.] Antioco Zucca. La soluzion del Grande Enigma. Bd. viii. Heft 3. J. Petzoldt. ' Die Notwendigkeit u. Allgemeinheit des psychophysischen Parallelismus.' [It is the ultimate postulate of all knowledge that whatever exists or happens is unam- biguously determined by its conditions. But no psychical fact is thus determined by other psychical facts. Hence all psychical facts are determined by their bodily concomitants. The simultaneity of conditions and conditioned holds for all unambiguous determination. This theory of parallelism is not to be taken as having metaphysical implications.] Emil Bullaty. ' Das Bewusstseinsproblem.' [The reality of which the material world is a phenomenon is directly manifested in the spontaneous functions of consciousness, i.e., Thought and Will. Hence it is possible for us to know this reality in spite of its not being immediately experienced in sensation or perception.] O. L. Winfrid. ' Die Losung des Weltratsels.' [What the riddle is, it is difficult to discover. The solution is somehow to be found in a rigid severance of the form of knowledge from its matter.] A. Guesnon. ' Raison pure et Metaphysique.' [An Exposition of the Philosophy of F. Evellin, mainly in the form of a series of extracts from his writings. The main point emphasised is the distinction between thinking in terms of the imaginable and the thought which is concerned with the unimagin- able. To this distinction there corresponds an ultimate division of philosophical points of view.] KANTSTUDIEN. Bd. vi., Heft 4. A. Gallinger. ' Zum Streit iiber das Grundproblem der Ethik in der neueren philosophischen Lit- teratur.' [(1) Defends Kant's Categorical Imperative, in the form 'Act so that you can always will the maxim of your will as a universal law,' against objections, and tries to show (2) that every ethical inquiry must presuppose some supreme criterion of moral action, and (3) that a consistent application of any other criterion than Kant's Law leads to conflict with actual moral judgments. To show (3) we have mainly a long critique of Paulsen and a short one of Gizycki, and to show (2) mainly critiques of Sirmnel and Stern : (1) also includes short critiques of Windelband, Jodl and Brentano. The author shows conclusively that these writers have neglected most important distinctions ; but he seems himself blind to others equally important, and is grossly unfair in some of his objections to Paulsen. His defence of Kant's formula is highly ingenious and novel (based, he says, on Lipps): he assumes that ' can will ' refers to a psychological fact, namely, that we all always will the same universal rules of action, and that ' under like circumstances ' refers only to those among the actual circumstances which we take into account ; by which two definitions (which Kant certainly never intended) he makes it plausible that all normal moral judgments could be deduced from his formula : but he seems quite unconscious, that by thus restricting the meaning of the Imperative and by making it a mere criterion, he destroys its relevancy to two other problems which Kant certainly intended to solve, (1) the definition of what ' right ' means (2) the proof that obedi-
