158 F. H. BRADLEY : indefensible. In the first place my consent is given always to a foreign force, and in the end it is given always to a foreign will. In the second place consent is not my mere awareness that something is to come from this will, but it implies necessarily that to some extent I am responsible for the result. If, where I might have hindered another's act, I have not attempted to hinder it, I may be taken as a con- dition of the act and therefore so far as its cause. On the other hand to call such consent my volition of the act would be too untenable. And Prof. James, excluding such tacit consent, finds the essence- of will in the consent which is express. But while there is volition here certainly, so far as I will to express my consent, there is as certainly no volition of the act itself. And my consent never can amount formally to a volition of the act. Always in con- sent is interposed the idea of a foreign agent, and, however much by my consent I make myself a condition and so assume responsibility, I never, as consenting, am the real doer of the act in question. To give consent to an action, however expressly, stops short of uniting with another to will and to do it. 1 And consent is inapplicable to a common 1 Consent can of course be given in such a way that it amounts to an incitement, and it can be given in such a way as to have the opposite effect. But these effects, I submit, go beyond and fall outside of a bare consent. A further inquiry into the nature of consent is not necessary here, but the following remarks may perhaps be of service to the reader. The difficulty of denning consent does not lie merely in the uncertainty of the particulars, but attaches itself also to the general idea. Consent is a positive attitude of mind which must exist positively to a certain degree. But on the other hand that degree is determined only by nega- tion and by omission. Consent is a mental attitude of one agent towards the act of another. The first agent must be aware of the act, and up to a certain point must share the sentiment from which it proceeds. That point is fixed by the presence of abstention from resistance to the act as proposed or from attempt to nullify it if existing. As consenting I am dominated by a sentiment in accordance with the act, so far that either a feeling of hos- tility to it does not arise in my mind, or, if it arises, is prevented from carrying itself out. The result is that I do not oppose the act. It is a further condition of consent that (a) the act must be taken by me as in some sense to concern me, and (6) some kind of opposition is in my power, or taken by me to be so. The act must fall within the region which I take to be the sphere of my will, and in this sense must interest me. And some kind of volition to oppose the performance or continued existence of the act is always possible here. Consent must be distinguished from approval. Approval (a) extends beyond my personal concerns, and (6) involves some reference to a stan- dard. In these two senses it is impersonal and disinterested. Consent, in order to remain consent, must stop short at a certain point. If it becomes more than a positive state of feeling, measured
