A COMPENDIOUS CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 31 quite other in man than they would be in an animal with only "generic images" in the place of general ideas, and with only intelligent adaptation in the place of discursive thinking. The phases of the human mind called Emotion and Will point to ^Esthetic Philosophy and to Practical Philosophy (Ethics and Politics), as the phase of Thought points to Metaphysics. Here the last only, as having a more fundamentally theoretical character, comes directly into view. While Psychology, with its peculiar method, first shows us the outlet or the inlet to reality, it is Metaphysics that gives the direct theory of reality. From metaphysical analysis of knowledge in general there results the doctrine known as Idealism. All the "objects" of the positive sciences are resolved into appearances, related in forms which, like the elements related, are such only for Mind. So far as the material elements of knowledge are concerned, idealistic doctrine seems to owe most to English Experi- ential Philosophy. For the theory of relations or forms, it owes most to Kant and the " Intellectualists ". The truth in both lines of thought may be summed up in the position that, as the relations between the elements of experience are just as real, so also they are just as ideal, as the elements. That Metaphysics must include Ontology as well as Theory of Knowledge is again becoming clear. Evidence of this is to be found in the frankly speculative attitude taken up by Mr. Bradley as the representative of one view, and by Mr. McTaggart as the representative of the other, on the question of the Immortality of the Soul, relegated by Kant with all other ontological questions to the Practical Eeason. As an aid towards reclaiming the province of Ontology for Metaphysics, it may be worth while to attempt to contribute to the proof independently, as I think, of what is sectional in any philosophic school that the question, whether the individual soul is permanent, is accessible from the speculative side. Acceptance merely of Idealism and of the formal Laws of Thought would not, it seems to me, give us sufficient grounds for approaching it. We need some real proposition about mind. Now if all that is is ultimately mental, and if at the same time no permanence beyond the moment can be asserted of that which is, then the hypothetical position in which we should have been if furnished with formal truths, but confronted with a material chaos, becomes actual. There is no reason, however, to acquiesce in this result. As against
