FREDERIC W. H. MYERS, Human Personality. 517 and shut out from the primary consciousness. The occur- rence of such secondary consciousness, or consciousnesses, which were postulated many years ago by von Hartmann and by him distinguished as the "relatively unconscious," has now been proved (so far as inference can prove any consciousness other than my own) by modern studies in psycho-pathology, especially those of M. Pierre Janet. As regards the secondary consciousness the main point in dispute is as to its extension. While M. Janet would assign an independent fragment of secondary conscious- ness to every relatively independent form of nervous activity, even to such processes as the purely spinal reflex act, and while von Hartmann, though denying it to these simplest kinds of nervous activity, regards it as constantly accompanying the activity of groups of nerve-cells of rather greater complexity, others prefer to assume .its occurrence only where we have some ground for immediately inferring it, namely, in certain abnormal states, hysterical and somnambulic. (3) A third conception of an unconscious factor in mental life is that of psychical activities as distinct from psychical products, the states or phenomena of consciousness. This is von Hartmann's ' absolutely unconscious ' which has fallen into so much disrepute. Yet, as von Hartmann shows, the conception is current with many psychologists, and indeed unless we are pre- pared to regard consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon (in the sense of Huxley) we must I think admit the validity of this con- ception. Thus when I look at an object on my table its distance from me is given at once to consciousness ; yet we know that this state of consciousness results from a highly complex series of processes. Or again, when I lift in turn two perceptibly different weights in order to compare them, the judgment " lighter " or "heavier" is given immediately to consciousness as I lift the second weight ; the state of consciousness expressed by the phrase " this is heavier " is a product of an activity which lies altogether outside consciousness. The same holds true of far more complex states, if not of all, and as we ascend the scale of complexity it becomes increasingly difficult to postulate a physiological activity adequate to the production of the state of consciousness. (4) We have the concept of the Subconscious as presented by Prof. Ward. A presentation may persist with an intensity so feeble that it is no longer capable of diverting the attention to itself or of being voluntarily attended to. This is the basis of that doctrine of the Subconscious which refuses to accept the physio- logical explanation of the facts of mental retention and regards the mind as a vast storehouse of such subconscious presentations, each of which may, under favourable conditions, be so intensified that it rises again above the threshold of consciousness, as a dully glowing spark may be fanned into a flame. (5) The secondarily automatic processes, complex activities originally carried out with attentive consciousness, but after many repetitions performed apparently without consciousness of any
