Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/573

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PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 559 'The value of philosophy is often called in question ; how shall it vindi- cate itself against current scepticism ? In three ways. (1) By defining some point of view that is clearly philosophical, so that the complete occupation of this point of view will have the effect of translating an inquiry into one that is distinctly philosophical : this is the point of view from which consciousness is central in the world, and the world itself to be construed in terms of those activities by which consciousness reaches its content of realised experience ; (2) by determining some concept of method that will stamp as distinctly philosophical any inquiry that con- forms to its requirements: this method takes its departure from the heart of consciousness itself, and seeks to interpret the world in the light of the central effort of consciousness, attaining as its final result an interpretation of the world that reduces it directly to terms of reason and purpose ; (3) by defining a criterion that is distinctly philosophical and that will, therefore, stand as the ultimate test of philosophical validity : this criterion is reasonableness, itself referable to an absolute experience. One great need of the sciences and philosophy, at present, is unification under some comprehending and synthetic concept of know- ledge : workers in both fields should hold this larger ideal of knowledge as an article of faith. It will " help us in completing our ideals of being and of truth and duty ".] Q-. T. Ladd. ' Prolegomena to an Argument for the Being of God.' [(1) The universality of religion is now a de- monstrated fact. (2) Psychology (so far as it does not fall into the mistakes of anthropology) shows that the entire soul of man is con- cerned in and constitutionally committed to religion. The conception of God which has a preferred claim to reality is that which will satisfy all the demands of the soul of man in its historical development. (3) Important for the argument are a right solution of the problem of knowledge ; the world- view of spiritual monism ; and the cultivation of comprehensive and profound ideas of value.] D. Irons. 'Rationalism in Modern Ethics.' [An historical study of modern rationalism, from its first appearance in opposition to Hobbes, through Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, the moral sense theories of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume, the intuitionism of Price, and the abstract rationalism of Kant. " The rationalistic point of view develops under the influence of the conviction that the chief characteristic of morality is the unconditional nature of its demands. . . . Moral laws must be derived from reason, for reason alone gives rise to principles which are unconditionally valid. The criterion of reason, i.e., absence of contradiction, must therefore be the criterion of right. . . . Moral action is identical with rational ac- tivity.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. ix., No. 6. T. L. Bolton. ' A Biolo- gical View of Perception.' [" Perception is an attitude toward an object, as well as a complex of sensations, the attitude being characteristic of the object. . . . When the reaction which the object provokes in an animal is imperfect and can be improved by successive trials, or when the in- stinctive performance may be modified by experience, . . . consciousness comes to have functional value, and the material it uses to modify the performance is presented by the currents that flow backward from the organism during activity and are initiated by the movements the organism makes. . . . The back-stroke effects come first, and only as dis- crimination grows and rises to higher importance do the different afferent effects increase hi significance ; but they are always bound up with back- stroke effects. . . . Immediate appreciation of direct sensory effects is - . . less common than we suppose : . . . the perceptions (of intellec-