THE DISTINCTION OF INNER AND OUTER EXPERIENCE. 67 we have before us an object which exists independently of its presentation in the particular case ". On this view the seemingly independent outer object would be, if not relative to the individual thinker, yet relative to "consciousness in general," the rational self-consciousness which is the same in all human subjects. In reply we may point out that conceptual thought depends for its individual reference upon perceptive ex* perience, which is altogether special and concrete. As Kant himself granted, particular connexion in experience can only be learned from experience ; laws of nature like gravitation cannot be deduced a priori. The ground then of the particular character of individual objects and the special relations in which they stand to one another can only be found in perceptual experience. It is indeed only by an act of abstraction that we can picture a purely per- cipient ego. But none the less this percipient consciousness must take note of and be affected by realities other than itself, in order that universal experience may have its specific side. For conceptual thought can only evolve out of percep- tion what is implicitly contained in it. That the perceptive consciousness is not aware of this reference of the percept to something beyond itself is no disproof of the fact that there is such a reference. If inferential thought compels us to postulate this reference, we must accept its verdict. For we open the door to a hopeless scepticism, if we refuse to admit that the real must conform to what is rational. I shall now give one or two illustrations to show that experi- ence is not explicable unless we posit such a transsubjective reality. What we term external experience impresses us as con- taining an element of inevitableness. We are conscious that we have a share in directing the process of our thoughts or the movement of our limbs, but if we look to the heaven above or the earth around, the things we see we cannot help seeing. 1 The process of consciousness in the individual persons A, B, C and D, may be very different at a particular time, but at a certain moment they all, without choice on their part, register an experience X, say the appearance of the sun. Let us call the percepts of A, B, C and D, a, b, c, d ; then a, b, c, d contain an implicit reference to x, which becomes for universal thinking X. But suppose they do not, and that X is an abstraction elaborated out of a, b, c, d. 1 Berkeley, in his Principles of Human Knowledge, distinguishes in this way perception from imagination.
