II. HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE CATE- GORIES OF THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION. 1 (I.) BY J. ELLIS MCTAGGAET. THB object of this paper is to consider that part of the dialectic process which Hegel calls the Subjective Notion. The views which I shall put before you are, I believe, sub- stantially the same as those of Hegel, except on a few special points, which I shall notice as I come to them. 2 But the question which I wish to raise is not whether they are a faithful representation of Hegel, but whether they are intrinsically true. To discuss the former would be a comparatively unprofitable task, for many of the transitions from category to category are left by Hegel in almost hopeless obscurity. This is, I think, to be mainly attributed to two causes. The first is the excessive conden- sation especially of the Smaller Logic which at places gives room for little more than the mere naming of the categories, without any attempt to deduce them. This is specially noticeable in the Subjective Notion, from the great extent to which it is subdivided. The second cause is to be found in Hegel's tendency to let the polemic side of the dialectic sink out of notice. He was much more inclined to show that the higher category is suggested by the lower than to point out that the lower is contradictory without the higher. Unless this too is demonstrated, however, the dialectic loses all its cogency. And how it is to be demonstrated, in certain cases, Hegel leaves us to discover for ourselves, almost unaided. Our best course will thus be to attack Hegel's problem, aiding ourselves by his treatment of it, but not confining ourselves to his arguments. What, then, is the problem of the Subjective Notion ? The Subjective Notion forms, in the first place, the first 1 Bead before the Aristotelian Society. 2 The notes in which I defended my divergence on these points are here omitted for want of space.
