TYPES OF WILL. 299 what will follow from the alternative supposal. But is the disjunctive volition the combination of both hypotheticals ? If we think of both together " Suppose I do not go to Calais, I shall go to Boulogne," and " Suppose I do not go to Boulogne, I shall go to Calais " and become conscious of their mutual relations, we reach the conclusion, whether logically valid or not, that I shall go to Boulogne or Calais. Our two judgments have been succeeded by a single judgment ; and do we suppose that its psychosis gathers up and contains them as psychical facts ? Their " Suppose I go to Calais " and "Suppose I go to Boulogne" have given place to a definite "I shall go to the one town or the other ". They are only the psychical conditions on which this new disjunctive judgment is dependent. And assuming what is certainly not the psy- chical fact, that we always reach a disjunctive volition through first reflecting on two or more such hypothetical volitions, none the less it is not a combination, nor a putting of them side by side. Before it can occur their attitude of supposal must give place to a single assertorial attitude. Hypothetical volition does not assure me that anything will become fact : disjunctive volition assures me that, so far at least as I am concerned in its production, something will become fact. The judgment of hypothetical volition does not affirm that I am going to do anything ; the judgment of disjunctive volition affirms that I am going to do one thing or another. Our bias for analysing one form of thought into another will receive a good many checks of this sort before we recognise that the forms of thought and conation are unique differentiations. In distinguishing will from mere conations, we have been led to emphasise the judgment into which some conations develop as that which is distinctive of will. But the form of this judgment is not exclusively cate- gorical, disjunctive or hypothetical, affirmative or nega- tive ; and if we rely on the form alone and expect to find the qualitative difference of will within this form, we shall be disappointed. For we can easily construct hypothetical and disjunctive judgments similar to those we have just considered, which we can see at a glance are not volitions. "If he is there I shall see him," has the same form as the judg- ment "If he is there I will see him," yet the one is a mere judgment, the other also a volition. Nor is it that in the one the conation of desire is absent, in the other, present. For I may desire to see him in both cases ; but in the one this leads to a state of expectancy, in the other, to a state of will.
