TYPES OF WILL. 311 we have contrary desires which then is will ? That which proceeds from the self? But both proceed from the self, belong to different sides or interests of that one self. One, say, is the interest in our profession, the other, interest in our country ; or, one is the sentiment of pleasure, the other, the sentiment of duty. In all complex volition the self is ambiguous, and it is only at the decisive moment when we reject one desire and welcome its opponent that we know in which line of tendency the self is henceforth manifest. Then the self contracts. That which a moment before was one of its motives has now become an "obstacle" and a not-self. The volition has negatived it. It is excluded from the new limits of the self. And, instead of the conation of the self being ipso facto will, it is the conation which has become will that constitutes the sentiment from which it precedes the self. That mental system which has power to develop will becomes the new self. And the mental system, say of a fixed idea, though it culminate in the judgment of its pro- spective triumph and realisation, where it cannot develop a will, cannot become the self of the moment ; where it is opposed by the will of another system it becomes a not-self ; and all that proceeds from it is involuntary action. If we are then compelled to maintain our former definition as against this alternative conception of will, we cannot class the present type with involuntary actions. We must call it non- voluntary ideo-motor action. In other cases fear produces genuine involuntary action. The game of golf furnishes an excellent illustration of this. It is one of the most deliberate games ever invented. We are not called upon to face, as in cricket, a sudden situation to which we must promptly adapt ourselves ; but before each stroke we may exercise as much thought and deliberation as we judge necessary. It is therefore peculiarly influenced by the character and play of our ideas. In all difficult under- takings confidence aids success ; but in varying degrees. Here it is of so much importance that if we have an idea that we shall fail in any particular stroke we commonly do fail. Unreasonable fears disturb at times even good players. The sight of a long distance of sand or water will suggest to one that he will not succeed in driving his ball across it, though he knows himself capable of the achievement. And if he fail he will often tell you that he knew that he was going to fail. This judgment has irresist- ibly formulated itself in his mind through fear, though he is conscious of a voluntary resolution opposed to it. His volun- tary resolution cannot acquire the same degree of confidence.
