TYPES OF WILL. . 315 self, but does not impotently command him to rise ; or, that holding an animal which struggles to escape, does not bid it begone, but, what is more to the purpose, sets it free. The indicative and imperative moods may be ultimate categories of thought ; but if we have been tempted to iden- tify the imperative mood with volition, we must reluctantly conclude that it is often present in the state of conflict pre- ceding voluntary choice, and often absent in the decisive moment which abolishes our doubt and conflict. Yet where our object is to control the conduct of children, servants and our subordinates generally, volition assumes the attitude of an imperative, sometimes politely disguised as a request, sometimes assuming the peremptory tone of a com- mand. Will is not then essentially an imperative, any more than it is essentially defined in a categorical, a disjunctive or a hypothetical judgment. It is indicative as well as impera- tive. And the imperative, like the disjunctive and hypothe- tical judgments, is ambiguous, and may or may not contain will. Where it appears in the state of indecision pre- ceding choice, it is the specific attitude which our rival conations assume in face of the inward obstacle to their satisfaction ; where it appears in our external volitions, it is the specific attitude which these assume in the face of an external obstacle to their realisation. In the one case, the obstacle is a rival motive; in the other, it lies in the inertia and conflicting desires and will of our fellow-men. If we see a servant bringing us what we want, we do not order him to bring it ; if a child is doing what he is permitted to do, we do not order him to desist. Our order is given where with- out it our wants would not be attended to or our will would not be obeyed. But where people are angry, they often give meaningless or inconsistent directions ; they command that to be brought to them which they see is on the way, or children to cease doing what they have permitted them to do. The emotion of anger finds a vent in overcoming the obstacle of a proper self-respect and dignity in subordinates. We can now understand why it is that the imperative does not appear in the volitions that control our own conduct. Where our end can be obtained independently of the aid or concurrence of our fellow-men, the imperative is absent, because its presence would be meaningless. If our volition has been preceded by a conflict of motives, that conflict has now ceased, our course is decided, and there is nothing for an imperative to accomplish. But it appears in this state of indecision preceding choice, because volition is absent, and
