320 ALEXANDEB F. SHAND : There is sometimes an overpowering assurance about "You will do this ; " a cool, deliberate determination, so different from the abrupt " Do this," where it springs impulsively, suggests a threat and hides a suspicion of failure. But a more striking difference remains to be pointed out. In " You will do this " leave this letter and bring back the answer there is always a clear anticipation of a future event, but this anticipation like others may be mistaken. The man may do something else or refuse. In other words, " You will do this," is a judgment referring to a future event : " Do this," is a command referring to a future event. The judgment is either true or false : the command is neither true nor false. It is not shown to be false or mistaken, like the judgment, when the event referred to is not accomplished ; nor does it become true, like the judgment, when it is. The failure of the judgment is error, a mistake in its conjecture ; the failure of the imperative is a thwarted purpose. But we are not yet at the bottom of the difficulty. The judgment, " You will do this," may, as we have seen, be more than a judgment ; it may also contain a volition : in the same way as the imperative may also imply an anticipation or judgment. In that case the judgment, " You will do this," means, " I command you to do it, therefore you will do it ". The anticipation or judgment of the future event is the con- sequence of the implied command or imperative. And similarly, when we give a command and are also conscious of anticipating its accomplishment, this judgment only arises because we are conscious that the command has been given. This implication of a command in the judgment, " You will do this," comes out more clearly if we substitute the word ' shall ' for ' will '. There can then be no mistake about the presence of volition. But it carries also the meaning that this imperative has been already partially thwarted or that at least there are clear signs of disobedience, as when a nurse having repeatedly used the imperative, " Sit still," to a restless child without the required result, clenches it in the judgment, "You shall sit still," and thumps it down on the seat. "You shall do it," means, "I will make you do it, and having ordered you to, will use physical force to compel obedience ". We have seen that in these alternative phrases which we may use instead of the imperative mood, though not without a certain alteration of our meaning, the categorical judg- ment, which they prominently express, still carries with it more or less clearly the imperative as its basis ; and that by
