HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION. 349 presence of the wider, and that the presence of the wider Universal implies the presence of one of a certain number of the narrower. This, of course, like all the categories to which Hegel has given the names of Judgment and Syllogism, relates to the reality which is the object of knowledge, and not to the mental processes by which we come to know it. The repeti- tion of this may not be unnecessary, since the constant use of the terms of formal logic is apt to confuse the student the moment he is off his guard. In this case the distinction is clear. From the admission that reality is such that it cannot be adequately expressed without Categorical Judg- ments, it has been easy to deduce that it is such that it cannot be expressed without Disjunctive Judgments. But if our knowledge entitles us to make a Categorical Judgment on any subject, it by no means follows that it will entitle us to make the corresponding Disjunctive. We may know that the lion is a mammal, and be very far from knowing the com- plete list of species to one of which every mammal must belong. 1 SYLLOGISM. QUALITATIVE SYLLOGISM. Another question now arises, and compels us to enter the third and last division of the Subjective Notion. We have said that two Universals are necessarily connected. How, and by what, is this necessary connexion made ? It is a connexion of two Universals which are not identical, for if they were the proposition would be utterly trivial. On what can we base this union in difference ? To the triad in which this point is settled Hegel gives the name of Syllogism. This seems to me an inappropriate term. The first of the three divisions does indeed correspond closely to the Syllogism of Formal Logic. But the second corresponds to Induction, which is not usually called a Syllogism. To the third division the name is still more in- appropriate, since in it the necessity of mediation by a third term is, as we shall see, transcended altogether. But, in the absence of a better name, it will perhaps be advisable to retain this one. The problem which we have now before us is one which 1 I have omitted Hegel's triad of Judgments of the Notion (see Note C, which, with the other notes of the series, is here omitted for want of space).
