AN ATTEMPT AT A PSYCHOLOGY OF INSTINCT. 69 In conclusion, I venture to propose a formula to represent what the psychologist finds in making a cross section of the instinctive consciousness. 1 In constructing the formula I assume that there are three elements of mind, sensation, affection (pleasure-pain) and conation. Whether the activity intended by the third is an experiential fact or an inference from experiential facts, whether, i.e., conation denotes an ' active ' process or a complex of organic sensa- tions, is of no importance for the present purpose. The element of sensation I would represent by a small s. This covers all ideas and perceptions actually present in instinct. Ideas are undoubtedly a part of the instinctive consciousness, but they are obscured by feeling and impulse. As has been said already, there is no idea in instinct of the end toward which its acts are directed, and no precise corre- lation of the acts with external perceptions. The affective element is more conspicuous and more decisive in its influence. Whether present as mere feeling of pleasure and pain, or in the form of emotion, it is often the most prominent element in the instinctive consciousness. If mere feeling is present I represent it by a large A. This repre- sents alternating pleasure and pain, accompanying either the introductory organic sensations or the instinctive action. If feeling is present in the form of some emotion we have, besides the affective element, a distinct idea or group of ideas, which we may represent by a large S, and the less noticeable active element which we represent by a small c (conation). Emotion will then be symbolised by SAc. 2 Finally, we must recognise the importance of the impul- sive character of instinct, and conclude our formula by a large C. There is unquestionably present in very many cases of instinct the most intense ' consciousness of activity ' 1 The formula used here is one already given by Professor Titchener in the Philosophical Review, iii., p. 430. The accompanying paragraph is a concise statement of several points which have been elaborated in the present paper. 2 The emotions present in instinct are commonly misrepresented by the terms in which they are described, both in scientific treatises and in popular works. When a bird flies off its nest to attack an intruder, it is wholly unpsychological to refer to the act as a manifestation of the instinct of maternal love. A cross section of the bird's consciousness would probably give a blurred perception of the intruder, accompanied by a flurry of most unpleasant organic sensations of varying nature and intensity, which bring up in turn a series of impulses to fly back and forth, and to utter sharp, quick cries. " Maternal love," " sympathy," and all similar terms should be applied to intelligent and consciously purposive action ; and this is just what instinct is not.
