Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/147

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NEW BOOKS. 133 Ptgehohffie als Erfahrungswissenschaft. Von HANS CORNELIUS. London : Williams & Norgate, 1897. Pp. xv., 445. This is a valuable and important book, marked by lucidity and fineness of analysis. Critical notice, which owing to unavoidable circumstances has been delayed, will appear in the next number of MIND. Saggio sulla Volonta. Per GIUSEPPE TARANTINO, libero docente di filosofia nella Universitd, di Napoli. Napoli : F. di Gennaro e A. Morano. London : Williams & Norgate, 1897. Pp. 130. This Essay on the Will is mainly concerned with the problem of Free Will, of which the solution is found in Determinism, reconciled with moral freedom by the intervention of the ego. The first part of the book, entitled " An Analytical Examination of the Will," is mainly a demonstration of the accordance of Aristotle's definition with modern theories. Signer Tarantino's view is, briefly, that every physical state tends to pass over into movement. Movement being a primitive fact, the function of will is essentially inhibitive. Will is the motor reaction of ideas and feelings. The motor force of an idea depends on the degree in which it has a sensible content or is connected with feeling, which is " the subjective consciousness of the objective state of the vital energy ". Every affective state involves a cognitive element ; but in the primitive organism this is overpowered by the effective element. The development of will proceeds side by side with the development of cognition. The second part of the book deals with the metaphysical aspect of the question. Without the doctrine of determinism there could be no expla- nation of human action ; but in accepting this fact we must recognise two factors in volition, motive and character, of which the latter is the more important. " An act of will may be considered as the result of the reaction of the individual character." Consciousness, like movement, is primordial ; but in animals and young children the conflict of desires is decided on the principle of the parallelogram of forces, and consciousness is present, if at all, merely as a spectator. With intellectual develop- ment, will develops. Ideas are the motive force of action ; and will depends, not on the number, but on the degree of organisation, of our ideas. To call the will free in the sense of independent of motives is absurd, since a causal nexus must underlie all volitional acts. Freedom consists in the development of character. The practical aspects of the question have considerable interest for the author, and he makes some pertinent remarks on education and crimin- ology. Obbietto e limiti della filosofia del diritto. Di S. FRAGAPANE. Roma : E. Loescher, 1897. Pt. i., pp. 156. This, the first instalment of Mr. Fragapane's work on the philosophy of law, has a sub-title of its own : / criteri d'una limitazione positiva della Jil'iaofia del diritto. The second part will deal with the relations of the philosophy of law to the theory of knowledge and to ethics ; the third will treat of the phenomenology of law. The main argument of the present part is a somewhat angry protest iiist recent methods of dealing with the subject in Italy. The writer appears to plead for a treatment which shall be less infected with meta- physics and more in sympathy with sociology. But it cannot be said that the work leaves a very definite impression on the reader's mind.