156 F. H. BBADLEY: b into B and which so brings in c, is related to b, whether, in short, and how far this difference is really accidental. Let us take once more the example which we used above. When I remember that on Tuesday last I sent my letter, the send- ing does not follow of itself from the mere idea of myself on last Tuesday. Thus I cannot prove that I sent the letter, and I can even imagine that in fact I did not send it. The connexion, therefore, between the day and the act is not visibly logical, and it may be urged further that the connexion is not logical at all. The predicate, it may be said, does not in memory truly and really belong to the subject of the process. The predicate, on the contrary, is added brutally from without, and is attached by something quite external, and in memory, therefore, as was the case with mere chance imagination, ideal continuity is broken. Now a breach of visible continuity I have agreed must be admitted, and memory therefore will fall short of inference. There is no proper inference where you predicate the con- clusion of the subject because the subject is conditioned by something not intrinsically developed from its own nature. But in memory on the other hand the constraint is not wholly external. For the necessity is taken to lie within the content of the ideal process which develops the subject. From the idea of myself on Tuesday I pass to the sending of my letter because of something which belongs to the nature of things which is taken as present at that date. The com- pulsion in other words is assumed to come, not from mere matter of fact, but from the special character of a certain concrete fact. 1 We wrote the premises of inference as A6, be, and of mere imagination as A6, Be, where B was equivalent to b(x), and where about the x we could say nothing whatever. But in memory that addition to and condition of Z>, which constitutes B, is taken not to be a mere x. The bond of union on the contrary is supposed to fall within the area of a specified content. The result is there- fore logical so far and not merely psychical. It is logical in so far as the x has been partly determined, and so far as the condition of the result has thus been brought within the process, and no longer, as in mere imagination, falls outside in the unknown. On the other hand, because the x cannot further be specified, the result, though taken as necessary, still falls short of a logical conclusion. For the condition 1 1 shall add at the end of this article some further remarks on the logical difference between memory and imagination, and on the ambi- guity of the term " matter of fact ". Mere imagination gives " matter of fact," in one sense, more than memory does.
