166 F. H. BRADLEY : REMARKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. point of our real series. Their truth therefore belongs to, and is conditioned by, what is known at least in part. The connexion on the one side remains outward and an unin- telligible conjunction, so far as its bond, though localised, is not made explicit. The condition cannot be specified and so brought within the subject, and the judgment to this extent remains irrational and mere matter of fact. But on the other side, so far as the connexion falls within, and is con- ditioned by, a limited area of content, so far as it belongs, in other words, to a special matter of fact, it has so far already ceased to be a mere conjunction, and has become intrinsic and rational. 1 It is impossible within these limits to attempt to show how the process once begun is carried farther. The growth of our knowledge consists, we may say, in the sustained endeavour to get rid of mere matter of fact, to make the bond of connexion explicit, and to bring the condition of the predicate within the content of the subject. A genuine and complete truth cannot be confined within one part of our real series, but, to be complete and genuine, must take in the rest. And observation, if repeated, 2 and in a higher degree artificial experiment, transcend the individual case and pass into general truth, truth not conditioned by the fact of any date. But whether in the end, and, if so, how far and in what sense, the externality of the predicate can wholly disappear, is a question which here cannot be dis- cussed. 1 A mere imagination, if you take it as an occurrence in my history, belongs to matter of fact in the above sense of limited and individual fact. But this is because you have taken it not logically but psycho- logically. If you confine yourself to its logical aspect and consider it with reference merely to what it asserts, it is of course so far not an event in my life and a thing which can be observed. It so far is not matter of fact, but possesses matter of fact in the sense of matter of fact in general. 2 In this respect memory remains inferior. To speak broadly and apart from a certain qualification, we have in memory a mere result which cannot be developed, and we cannot, as in continued and repeated observation, enquire further into the conditions of the result. For in memory (in the main) we are not in direct contact with these special conditions.
