the ultimate end rules; i.e., the idea of a general good directs feelings and thoughts to the particular good; in the latter—the thinking will—the idea of a particular good (the object) guides all other ideas and subordinates them to itself. In the former—to point out a still more definite contrast—his task, his vocation, “becomes” manifest (or has become manifest) to the man, “I ought to do this”; in the latter he “makes” (or has made) his plan, “I must do this”. Finally, to have recourse to current scientific conceptions, in the former the unconscious predominates in the will, in the latter the conscious.
25. There is a further classification of the forms of will which crosses this division, and is guided by that relation to activities which is common to both types. According as the sensuous element (sensations, perceptions), or the intellectual element (ideas, thoughts) preponderates therein, i.e. in the corresponding succession of ideas, there arise in each instance two chief forms, one of the beginning and one of the end; but between these we place the large mass in which the elements in question appear to be so mingled as to stand in a relative equilibrium.
26. There arise then six classes of forms of will, each of which, however, can be analysed again into subdivisions. We will indicate them here by letters:—
| W F s | W F s i | W F i | |||
| W T s | W T s i | W T i |
How far these conceptually constructed forms are really forthcoming, or coincide with such as are really forthcoming, is not the question here; nor, therefore, whether it is possible to denote them by words which are otherwise in use.
27. An object (A) becomes by an individual—e.g., my—will, sign of another object (B); this is, in order to represent the contrast with natural signs, the next problem. Reduced to the simplest and natural expression it runs: when I perceive A—although it stands in no natural connexion with B—I will think of B. But this “I will” may refer (in German literally) both to the present and to the future; it may imply a recollection which is to occur once or occasionally, or again one which is to be uniformly repeated. The recollection itself is bound essentially either to the perception or only to the idea, hence is of a more sensuous or a more intellectual type. But the will which forms the association, or is present in it, is here divided according to our scheme into its forms. On the one side stand two “events,” which are connected with each other by the “feeling-tone” of the one, or of both,
