but instead of referring to money—the half-natural sign of all values—it would refer like money directly to all values. Values are elsewhere made equal by exchange, in general therefore by trade; their equality has the conventional character. Here, on the contrary, an equation of values would take place according to scientific principles; values would all be referred to the necessary work incorporated in them, while the work again would be most simply referred to the average time of work. We often find a compromise between the former real and the latter ideal equation, e.g. in the legal determination of honoraria, or of official salaries, and it is also the basis of legal limitations of hours of work, and other interferences with free contract as the price-regulator of human labour. But the idea of reference to a “congealed labour-time” may further be aptly compared with the titles of property and claims which are both current in trade and legally valid; these have a reference indeed to a sum of money, but in pure titles to property (deeds) this reference is insignificant compared with its significance as participation in a capital, which figures only in the account with its money value.
56. The many senses in which we can say of a word or other sign that it has meaning, may then be classified as follows:—
1. Meaning according to the intention of the individual making use of the word or other sign (subjective meaning which is put into it).
2. But this meaning is essentially conditioned for the word, as for all socially valid signs, by the meaning which they have in regular usage (objective meaning). But the objective meaning is essentially different according as the social will which we regard as its originator develops this meaning by creating it together with the sign, or has assigned it for definite purposes to the sign. We call the former the natural, the latter the artificial meaning. The former is modified according to three forms of the will upon which it is based, and which we distinguish according to a principle which corresponds in the first genus (A) to the division of volitional actions into impulsive, habitual, and reflective; they were called, natural harmony, custom, belief, or in reference to language the impulse to form language, the usage of language, the genius of language.
57. But the forms of the social will of the other genus (B) were distinguished in an analogous manner according as it:—
1. Proceeds at its earliest stage from the individual will (sensuous stage);
