REMABKS ON THE PREDICATES OF MORAL JUDGMENTS. 193 equality of their rights by inflicting upon him a punishment which is unduly severe. It is, so far as I can see, the emphasis laid on impartiality that gives the justice a special prominence in connexion with punishments and rewards. A man's rights depend to a great extent upon his actions. Other things equal, the criminal has not the same rights to inviolability as regards reputation, or freedom, or property, or life, as the innocent man ; the miser and the egoist have not the same rights as the bene- factor and the philanthropist. On these differences in rights, due to differences in conduct, the terms "just" and "un- just " lay stress : for in such cases an injustice would have been committed if the rights had beenregarded as equal. When we say of a criminal that he has been " justly " imprisoned, we point out that he was no victim of undue partiality, as he had forfeited the general right to freedom on account of his crime. When we say of a benefactor that he has been " justly " rewarded, we point out that no favour was partially bestowed upon him in preference to others, as he had acquired the special right of being rewarded. Of course the " justice " of a punishment or of a reward involves something more than this. What is, strictly speaking, "just" is always the dis- charge of a duty corresponding to a right which had been in a partial manner disregarded by a transgression of the duty. 1 If justice demands that a man should be punished, his not being punished is an injustice towards all those whose con- demnation of the wrong act finds its recognised expression in the punishment, inasmuch as their right of resisting wrong is thereby violated in favour of the wrong-doer. In cases where the claims of justice are not strictly denned, the comparatively lenient treatment of a criminal, though not being unjust per se, involves a special injustice towards other criminals, whose guilt was the same but whose punishment was more severe. Retributive justice admits of a certain latitude as to the retribution. It may be a matter of small concern from the point of view of justice whether men are fined or im- prisoned for a certain crime. But it is a just claim that, under equal circumstances, all of them should be punished with the same severity, since the crime has equally affected their rights. The notion of " justice," thus implying a kind of right- 'The relation between "just" and "unjust" is the same as that be- tween " right " and " wrong ". An act is "just," in the strict sense of the word, if its omission is " unjust ". At the same time, non-obligatory acts that are " not unjust " can hardly be denied to be " just," in a vague sense, although they are not demanded by justice. 13
